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INTRODUCTION 
The technical portions of the space shuttle Phase B studies presently being 
conducted by several major contractors, as well as on-going or proposed related 
systems studies, concern themselves with vehicle preliminary designs, conceptual 
studies, tradeoffs and optimizations, with emphasis on the systems and their 
technologies. Little effort can, and is, currently being devoted to a system- 
atic appraisal of the availability, state of the art, and required technologies 
for specific pieces of hardware in these various systems. This evaluation 
concerns itself with the hardware required for shuttle cryogenic systems. It 
will be postulated that certain of the current - mainly Saturn V - designs and 
design concepts appear to be basically suitable to fill some of the needs, 
while for others potentially serious technology voids may exlst. 
the latter, effective utilization of available lead time is urged, and recom- 
mendations are presented. 
To remedy 
During the contacts with a number of Saturn cryogenic hardware suppliers and 
users, opinions about the scope of technology deficiencies varied widely. 
However, rather uniform agreement was noted with the conclusion that diligence 
and ideas, rather than breakthroughs, will be required for successful design 
and development of reliable shuttle hardware. 
Xainly as the result of a consensus of expert opinion than of a systematic 
study, it is expected that the more serious technology voids will be with the 
cryogenic hardware required for the main propulsion systems, because of prob- 
lems caused by their size, in combination with substantia€ly more demanding 
performance requirements. Emphasis, therefore, will be placed an these 
components, within the confines of space and time allotted, However, refer- 
ence will be made as needed to the other propulsion systems. The buIk of the 
discussion concerns itself with feed system valves and ducting, and with tank 
pressure regulation and vent components. 
be touched upon, or at least identified for future attention. 
Peripheral cryogenic hardware will 
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To reliably identify cryogenic hardware technology voids, an 
understanding is needed of the differences between the con- 
ditions to which components that were successfully used on 
current launch systems are qualified, and those conditions 
that components needed for the shuttle will have to meet. 
This must be the first step. Unfortunately, the information 
currently available is incomplete, and opinions vary over a 
wide range. The assumptions made for this survey, therefore, 
must be considered best guesses, based on currently available 
information. With this reservation, they do provide a guide 
to create a feeling for what is available, or may be avail- 
able, and what is missing and which, therefore, requires 
action. Whatever these identified actions are, they entail 
risks that must be taken into account through alternate 
contingency plans. 
- 
- 
WHAT'S ei FRRENT? 
WHAT'S AVAILABLE? 
WHAT'S M I S S I N G ?  
WHAT MUST BE AND I S  BEING DONE? 
R I S K S  
SATURN V - SPACE SHUTTLE 
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D E F I N I T I O N  O F  CRYOGENIC SYSTEMS HARDWARE 
To establish a boundary for this discussion, the tabulation 
identifies those cryogenic components that are expected to 
be required regardless of which overall design for shuttle 
orbiter and booster is chosen. It further underscores the 
fact that almost exclusively, these are functional types 
that have been used extensively on current cryogenic sys- 
tems. Within the time and space available, a preliminary 
assessment will be attempted €or some of the foremost cur- 
rently used (Saturn) components listed. 
0 ENCOMPASSES PROPELLANT FEED AND VEHICLE TANK LOADING A N D  
PRESSURIZATION HARDWARE 
INCLUDES: 
VENT VALVES 
SHUTOFF VALVES (SUCH AS PREVALVES) 
FILL 8 DRAIN VALVES 
REG ULATORS 
DISCONNECTS 
VACUUM JACKETED LINES 
€HECK VALVES 
SEALED JOfNTS 
MAY LNCLUDE: 
AUXl LI ARY GAS GENERATORS 
AUXl LtARY TURBO PUMPS 
AUXILIARY HEAT EXCHANGERS 
PROPELLANT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM COMPONENTS 
PROPELLANT ACQUISITION AND THERMODYN. VENTING 
SOLENOID VALVES, PRESSURE SWITCHES 
PROPELLANT REClRCULATtON SYSTEM COMPONENTS 
INSTRUMENTATLO N COMPONENTS 
SYSTEM COMPO ME N T S  
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CRYOGESIC HARDWARL ?ERFORXANCE CO?IPARISON 
MAX 
ECOMME N DE D ALLOWABLE 
)ESIGN LEAK RATES 
IFE CYCLES (SCIM) 
15000 10 
10000 20 
3000 10 
15000 - 
Information on required cryogenic hardware cycle life, allowable leakage, and 
resistance to vibration effects is meager to unavailable. Estimates, where 
made, differ over a wide margin. The figures presented for expected average 
shuttle operational life are the author's best guesses. Where challenged, 
they are usually considered too low. The allowable shuttle component leak 
rates are dictated predominantly by orbiter needs to maintain internal tank 
pressure during stay in orbit. However, because of expected emphasis on 
common hardware use, several booster components would be similarly affected. 
The values quoted (assumed to be for nonvibrational environment) are more 
than an order of magnitude smaller than those specified for the Saturn S-I1 
stage, as an example. These low rates, coupled with larger nominal component 
sizes, in several instances represent a major area of concern. Nothing 
reliable is known, nor will be known for some time, about the flight vibration 
characteristics to which the cryogenic hardware will be exposed. Even if it 
is assumed that these are not worse than those encountered on the Saturn 
stages, it leaves an awesome factor of two orders of magnitude for cumulative 
flight duration. This is another area of major concern. 
N O M  SIZE DESIGN 
(INCHES) LIFE CYCI 
7 600 
8 750 
a 1000 
2.3 1500 
The vibration durations listed for Saturn Component Oualification represent 
the total of sinusoidal sweep and dwell, and of random vibrations, in all 
axes. For the shuttle, th'e figures represent accumulated flight time only. 
How difficult the task will be will depend on the philosophies applied to 
shuttle component qualification testing. 
SOTES: 1 S-I1 powered flight rime is six minutes 
temperature, vibration) 
2 Leak rates not fully defined (gas type, pressure, 
S-l l  ACTUALS I "ORDER OF MAGNITUDE" ESTIMATED SHUTTLE REQUIREMENT 
COMPONENT 
VENT VALVES 
PREVALVES 
FILL I DRAIN 
VALVES 
REGULATORS 
DISCONNECTS 
(VENT; F I  D; 
ETC.) 
PRE-PRESS. 
CHECK VALVES 
FEED LINES 
N O M  SIZES 
INCHES) 
(E ST 
1 TO 10 
1/2 TO 2 
rVERAGE 
1 PE RAT IO N A  L 
IFE CYCLES 
100 MISSIONS) 
5000 
3000 
1000 
5000 
500 
1000 
dAX 
4L LOWA B LE 
.EAK RATES 
: K I M )  
500 
450 
1500 
- 
4PPROX 20 
KIM 
KTUALS " 
I IN. SIZE 
100 
14TO 16 I I 8 I 1 MISSION 
VIBRATION REQUIREMENTS: UNDEFINED (COMPARATIVE CUMULATIVE SHUTTLE COMPONENT FLIGHT 
EXPOSURES OF 10 HOURS, VS 6 MINUTES ON SATURN V, MUST BE EXPECTED) 
192 
TYPICAL PROPOSED SHUTTLE MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM SCHEMATIC 
The schematic shown may be considered typical for both, orbiter 
and booster, except that the two would differ as to the number 
of engines and, depending upon which specific concept is being 
considered, the subdivision of propellant tankage and the 
required duct and line manifolding. In many respects, this 
functional diagram is also representative of the other 
(auxiliary) shuttle propulsion systems (booster and/or orbiter), 
except that the latter may include systems concepts such as are 
required for propellant storage and acquisition, ability to 
operate vertically and horizontally (air breathing system), and 
zero-g venting. These are not shown here. It is expected, 
however, that the success of these subsystems and concepts will 
depend more on systems technology than on the state-of-the-art 
of the hardware of  which they will be composed. 
H2 V l N T  DISCONNFC ' I  
LH2 FILL A N D  DRAIN 
VALVE A N D  
DISCONNECT I 
wc 
E? 
CHECK VALVE 
CAPACITANCE 
/ M A I N  II \ AND p') 
\ 
L 
GH? PRESSURANT G O 2  / HEAT EXCHANGER 
F'RESSURANT 
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S H2 
PRESSURE 
REGULATOR 
HE L lUM 
A N D  CHECK 
VALVE 
GO X 
PRESS 
RE G U M  TOR 
t * I L  Ih" 
A N D  CHECK 
VALVE 
LO2 FILL A N D  DRAIN 
VALVE A N D  
DISCONNECT 
NOTES: 
I .  COMPONENT 
REDUNDANCY 
OMITTED F O R  
CLARITY 
2. PNEUMATIC 
SYSTEM OMITTED 
F O R  CLARITY 
7-INCH VENT & RELIEF VALVE 
~- 
CYCLES 600 MINIMUM 
VI BRAT10 N 
LEAKAGE 500 SClM He 
5- 1/2 HO URS 
Requirements for shuttle use in the areas shown are over 
an order of magnitude more stringent than for Saturn. S-I1 
hardware condition following qualification is reported to 
have been excellent, suggesting a potential for increased 
life. Full achievement of shuttle requirements without 
modifications and verification appears doubtful. Leak 
requirements may be unachievable and indicate the potential 
need for alternate systems solutions (such as in-orbit 
isolation valves). Improvements to achieve narrower vent 
bands and improved position indicators will require special 
attention. ' 
15000 
>IO HOURS 
10 SClM 
DESIGN 8 PRODUCTION: AMETEK/CALMEC 
USE: SATURN S-11, LH2 8 LOX 
TYPE: PO PPES 
PRINCIPAL REQUIREMENTS: 
PARAMETER SATURN COMPONENT ESTIMATED REQUIRED 
SHUTTLE DESIGN I POINTS (0) QUAL1 FlCATlON I 
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT: 
POTENTIAL CANDIDATE FOR SHUTTLE ORBITER 
SCOPE OF ADDITIONAL DEVELOPMENT UNCERTAIN 
(ENDURANCE LIMITS NOT EXPLORED) 
194 
10-INCH VENT C RELIEF VALVE 
PARAMETER SATURN COMPONENT 
QUAL1 FlCATtO N 
CYCLES 1000 
VIBRATION ~ 1.2 HOURS 
LEAKAGE 750 SClM He 
A b e t t e r  d e f i n i t i o n  of booster  i n - f l i g h t  (v ib ra t ion )  maxi- 
mum al lowable l eak  r a t e s  is  required f o r  a b e t t e r  assess- 
ment of t h e  b a s i c  s u i t a b i l i t y  of t h i s  va lve  f o r  Space 
S h u t t l e  use. 
been explored. 
It appears t h a t  cyc le - l i f e  l i m i t s  have not 
ESTIMATED REQUIRED 
SHUTTLE DESIGN 
POINTS (B) 
75000 
10 HOURS 
5 750 SClM GH2 
DESIGN A N D  PRODUCTION: WHITTAKER 
USE: 
TYPE: VISOR 
SATURN S-IC 
STATUS: QUALIFIED F O R  S-IC 
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT: POSSIBLE CONCEPT FOR 
PREVALVE BUT PROBABLY 
N O T  FOR VENT VALVE 
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2.8-INCH REGULATOR 
PARAMETER 
CYCLES 
VIBRATION 
LEAKAGE 
CAPACITY 
LB/SEC 
The regulator embodies a principle that has been successfully 
demonstrated in operational use. Those familiar with its 
performance believe that it is a strong candidate for booster 
use, subject to exploratory tests, modifications, and 
demonstration. 
SATURN CQMFONENT ESTWATED REQUIRED 
QUAUFICATION SHUTTLE DESIGN 
POiNTS (E) 
APPROX. 1500 ~ 5 0 0 0  
2 HOURS 10 HOURS 
NO SHUTOFFMODE NO SHUTOFF MODE 
50 GOX 38-45 GOX; 19 GH2 
(MAX EST) 
8-INCH FILL IS DRAIN DISCONNECT 
In the design shown, the airborne half essentially consists of the mating ring 
with sealing surfaces. 
stationed. 
half, including its built-in butterfly shutoff valve, after every launch. 
This practice stems from the fact that it is exposed to copious amounts of 
launch pad cooling water, salty air and atmospheric moisture, essentially 
without protection downstream (outside) of the built-in valve. Also, suffi- 
cient time is available. 
All more complex parts of the coupling are ground- 
The current practice is t o  have the supplier refurbish the ground 
In the opinion of experts, the ground half wobld be reusable an indefinite 
number of times if it were adequately protected against the cited effects. 
Based on experience from Saturn and other launch vehicles, they believe this 
would be a matter of implementing such protection. This may include opera- 
tional changes, angular attitude of disconnects, purges, doors. Similarly, 
the airborne half should be reusable as is, exeept that simple provisions for 
routine replacement of mating parts (especially the seal) may be the most 
economical way. 
A number of smaller disconnects is in use on Saturn. These are also con- 
sidered basically ready for shuttle use, if cleanliness and dryness are 
assured by proper means. 
DESIGN 8 PRODUCTION: ROYAL INDUSTRIES 
USE: SATURN S-ll, LOX 8 LH2 
TYPE: 
PRINCIPAL REQUIREMENTS: 
PARAMETER 
NOM SIZE 
CYCLES 
(DISENG) 
CYCLES 
(GR VALVE) 
VIBRATION 
LEAKAGE 
(GR VALVE) 
LEAKAGE 
(COUPLING 
BUTTERFLY (BUILT-IN 
GROUND VALVE) 
ATURN COMPONENT 
NALI FlCATlON 
8 I N .  
100 
500 
4 HOURS 
300 SClM 
60 SCIM 
iSTlMATED REQUIRED 
iHUTTLE DESIGN 
'OINTS 
8 IN. (0); 10 IN. (8) 
500 
1500 
10 HOURS 
300 SCIM 
60 SClM 
STATUS: QUALIFIED FOR SATURN S-ll 
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT: 
BASICALLY READY FOR SHUTTtE USE, I F  ADEQUATELY 
PROTECTED 
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PRINCIPAL AREAS OF CONCERN 
c 
In discussions with suppliers and users of current cryogenic 
systems hardware the principal areas of concern listed 
emerged. For vibration requirements, the concern was virtually 
unanimous. This may be attributed to the fact that a number of 
current cryogenic components had - sometimes substantial - 
difficulties in passing qualification, and that qualification 
specifications for the Space Shuttle may be vast€y more 
stringent. Not much Less concern is in evidence r:.garding 
leakage requirements, especially when viewed in combination 
with the vibration conditions, the increased life cycle require- 
ments, and potential cumulative. contamination. Lesser concern 
is voiced about the life-cycle numbers, the only areas in which 
shuttle data are cautiously predietatrle. It is believed that 
full utilization of current technology and meticulous attention 
to all details will solve life-cycle problems. It was noted 
that cryogenic components of comparable size are in successful 
operational use, although with less stringent requirements. 
VIBRATION ENVIRONMENT - MAJOR 
LOW LEAKAGE REQUIREWENTS - SERIOUS 
LIFE CYCLE REQUIREMENTS - MODERATE 
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EXTRAPOLATION TO OTHER SHUTTLE CRYOGENIC SYSTEMS HARDWARE 
The hardware required for auxiliary shuttle propulsion systems, specifically 
the de-orbit, airbreathing, and attitude control systems, and as defined 
earlier, is expected to consist of components of smaller nominal size, com- 
pared to those for the main propulsion system. The smaller masses, smaller 
diameters, shorter sealing circumferences, and the smaller absolute cobtraction/ 
expansion factors, among perhaps others, are expected to lessen some of the 
expected problems. 
With this in mind, the cursory evaluation performed and the conclusions drawn 
here are largely applicable to this hardware. This does not include, however, 
technologies associated with systems concepts such as propellant storage, 
systems packaging (RCS),  expulsion devices and the like. 
Several successful operational systems (Centaur; S - I V :  RLlO, and 5-2 Engines) 
should provide valuable experience for extrapolation to the Space Shuttle. 
0 THE GENERALLY SMALLER SIZES R-EQUIRED SUGGEST SMALLER 
PROBLEMS 
SPEClFlC AND GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR M I N  PROPULSION 
SY STfM CRYOGEN IC COMPONENTS APPLY 
0 RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS INCLUDE THJS HARDWARE 
0 REPRESENTATIVE EXPERIENCE EXISTS (CENTAUR, S- IV  5-2, Rl-1OO) 
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RISKS 
Whatever  i s  done  o r  p l a n n e d  a t  t h i s  e a r l y  s t a g e ,  t h e r e  are 
c e r t a i n  r isks  i n v o l v e d  t h a t  w i l l  r ema in  d e s p i t e  a l l  c a r e f u l  
p l a n n i n g  and  e v a l u a t i n g .  The l i s t  shown p r o b a b l y  i s  incom- 
p l e t e  b u t  may convey a f e e l i n g  f o r  p o t e n t i a l  r i s k s  t h a t  h a v e  
a c t u a l l y  b e e n  i n c u r r e d  and  w i t h  which  most  a g e n c i e s  and 
c o n t r a c t o r s  are w e l l  f a m i l i a r .  
BELATED ATTENTION TO HARDWARE DFTAIL -- "PAN ICs" 
0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS SIGNIFICANTLY MORE SEVERE THAN EXPECTED 
0 DISCOVERY OF TECHNOLOGY DEFICIENCIES SIGNIFICANTLY LARGER THAN EXPECTED 
0 MAJOR LATE SYSTEMS CHANGES AFFECTING HARDWARE 
0 EXPERIENCED SUPPLIERS DEFUNCT OR UNWILLING TO BID 
0 LATE NEED TO SWITCH A SUPPLIER 
0 NEW PROCUREMENT PERSONNEL 
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RECOMMENDATIONS 
I n  order  to channel t h e  thinking of those who w i l l  be respons ib le  
f o r  generat ing t h e  cryogenic hardware f o r  Space  S h u t t l e  use i n  
t h e  r i g h t  d i r e c t i o n ,  t o  permit them t o  start  thinking,  and t o  
open a channel f o r  i d e a  exchange, e a r l y ,  a l b e i t  condi t iona l ,  
d e f i n i t i o n  of t h e  most l i k e l y  b a s i c  design and q u a l i f i c a t i o n  
requirements is urgent ly  recommended. 
For t h e  optimum u t i l i z a t i o n  o f  t i m e  and funding, e a r l y  evalua- 
t i o n  of design concepts t h a t  had been s u c c e s s f u l  f o r  p a s t  
appl ica t ions ,  notably Saturn,  is advised. S i m i l a r l y ,  experi-  
ments t o  uncover hidden unknowns should prove b e n e f i c i a l .  
The a v a i l a b i l i t y  of some of t h o s e  s u p p l i e r s  who cont r ibu ted  
q u a l i t y  hardware i n  t h e  p a s t  appears  t o  be uncer ta in  i n  some 
instances.  Since r e l e a r n i n g  and educat ing is known t o  be a 
c o s t l y  process ,  e a r l y  thought should be given t o  avoidance of 
problems. 
Since unforeseen s i t u a t i o n s  w i l l  arise as always, a l t e r n a t i v e  
r o u t e s  t o  so lve  t h e  most l i k e l y  problems should be  included 
i n  a l l  planning e f f o r t s .  
0 " M A X I M U M  RESULTS FOR M I N I M U M  $" 
GENERAL 
0 FULL UTILIZATION OF VALUABLE TIME 
SPEC IF IC 
0 EARLY DEFlNiTION OF DESIGN AND QUALlFlCATlON PARAMETERS 
0 EARLY HARDWARE DESIGN STUDIES AND EXPERIMENTAL €VALUATION OF 
PROMJ S M G  CONCEPTS 
0 EXPERIMENTS TO IDENTIFY EARLY HIDDEN TECHNOLOGY DEFICIENCIES 
0 STEPS TO ASSURE AVAllABlLJTY OF EXPERIENCED AND PROVEN MANUFACTURERS 
0 ADEQUATf CONSIDERATION O f  CONTlNGENCIES 
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